CBA Part 3: Arbitration

Under the new CBA, MLB changed its rules related to arbitration for players eligible for free agency. In years past, teams would choose whether or not to offer arbitration to their players eligible for free agency, and MLB classified players ranked in the top 20 percent at their position (as ranked by the Elias Sports Bureau) as Type A free agents. Those ranked in the 20-40 percentile at their position were classified as Type B free agents.

If a team offered its Type A free agents arbitration, and he declined the offer to sign with another team, the team that offered its player arbitration would receive two compensation picks. The free agent’s former team would receive the first pick in the June amateur draft from the team that ultimately signed the Type A free agent (if the signing team finished in the bottom 15 teams, it would not lose its first round pick, but instead its second round pick). The free agent’s former team would also receive a “sandwich” pick between the first and second rounds of the draft.

If a team offered its Type B free agent arbitration, and the free agent declined the offer to sign with another team, then the team offering arbitration would receive a single compensation “sandwich” pick between the first and second rounds in the June draft. The signing team would not lose any of draft picks.

So, looking at things from another angle, a team that signed a Type A free agent away from another team would lose its first pick in the draft to the team from which the free agent was signed.

Under the new CBA, the arbitration system has been totally revamped. Now, any offer of arbitration to a free agent must be in an amount of the average annual salary of the top 125 MLB players (or top 20 percent). This currently comes out to roughly $12 million per season.

So, under the new system, teams will weigh whether or not their free agents are worth at least $12 million a season. If a player thinks he can get more on the open market, he will decline arbitration and gamble on a better pay day elsewhere. So, the only teams that offer their free agents that $12 million in arbitration will be eligible for a compensation pick from the signing team, if their free agent declines arbitration to sign elsewhere.

This new system will most help free agent relievers who were formerly classified as Type A free agents. This year, there were eight Type A free agent relievers: Ryan Madson, Heath Bell, Matt Capps, Francisco Rodriguez, Octavio Dotel, Takashi Saito, Darren Oliver, and Francisco Cordero. How many of these guys are worth $12 million a season? In past years, if guys like Dotel and Oliver declined arbitration, any team signing them would lose their first round draft pick (or second round, depending on how well the signing team finished the prior season). This practice discouraged teams from signing Type A relievers. Many teams would not want to forfeit their first round draft picks to sign guys like Darren Oliver or Octavio Dotel?

Under the new system, the Cardinals would have needed to offer Dotel $12.4 million in arbitration; then, Dotel would have needed to decline that arbitration offer and sign elsewhere in order for the Cardinals to receive the compensation pick from the signing team. In reality, Dotel signed a one-year contract with the Tigers (with an option for 2013) for $3 million.

CBA Part 2: Playoff Reconfiguration

Major League Baseball’s latest collective bargaining agreement (CBA) will expand the playoffs by adding an additional wild card team in each league. Now, both leagues will advance five playoff teams each season.

Under the new alignment, each league will have its two wild card teams square off in a one-game playoff to see which team will then advance to each league’s division series. Aside from this “play-in” game between the two wild card teams, the rest of the playoff structure will be same: a best-of-five Division Series, a best-of-seven Championship Series, and a best-of-seven World Series.

MLB adopted its playoff system in 1969 with two division champions squaring off in a Championship Series; and, in 1994 MLB realigned and expanded the playoffs to include a champion from each of three divisions plus a wildcard team.

How many additional playoff berths would the Mariners have had, had this second wild card been added back in 1994? Well, it would have depended on some tie-breakers.

In 2007, the Mariners finished 88-74 (.543 winning %), which tied the Detroit Tigers for 5th in the American League. So, the Mariners would have played a one-game playoff against the Tigers, with the winner advancing as the 2nd AL wild card team. The Mariners, if they would have won the one-game play-in against the Tigers, would have faced off against the Yankees in the wild-card playoff game.

In 2003, the Mariners finished 93-69, three games behind Oakland in the AL West. 93 wins would have qualified the Mariners for the playoffs as the 2nd AL wild card team. They would have faced off against the Red Sox in the wild-card playoff game.

In 2002, the Mariners finished 93-69, ten games behind Oakland, and six games behind the Angels (who won the wild card). But, the Mariners still tied for the 5th best record in the AL. They would have squared off against the Red Sox in a one-game play-in for a chance to reach the one-game AL wild-card playoff game. Three of the four AL West teams could have qualified for the playoffs.

In 1996, the Mariners finished 85-76 (.528 %). Both the Red Sox and White Sox finished 85-77 (.525%). The Mariners had a game postponed at some point during the season that was never made up because it had no effect on the playoff picture. Under the new playoff structure, the Mariners would have played that last game. Had they won that postponed game, the Mariners would have qualified for the playoffs as the second wild card team at 86-76. Had they lost that postponed game, they would have been locked in a 3-way tie with the Red Sox and White Sox.

The three-way tie would have played out like this. The Commissioner would have conducted a draw, designating the teams A, B, and C. First, team A would play team B with team A as the home team. The following day, the winner of the that game would play team C with team C as the away team. The winner of the game on the second day would advance as the second AL wild card team. Because the Mariners and Red Sox were each 13-12 and the White Sox were 11-13 against the other tied teams (Mariners/Red Sox/White Sox), the Mariners and Red Sox would draw lots. The winner would choose its designation (A, B, or C) first; the loser of the draw would pick its designation second, with the White Sox being assigned the third designation.

Had MLB applied this latest playoff configuration since 1994, the Mariners would have definitely qualified for the playoffs at least one other time, 2003. They would have had additional tie-breaker opportunities to reach the playoffs three more times: 2007, 2002, and 1996.

The new playoff structure should keep winning teams in the playoff picture later into the season. At least, that’s what MLB hopes.

CBA Part 1: Regulation of Smokeless Tobacco

Major League Baseball’s new five-year collective bargaining agreement contains a number of new provisions. I would like to spend part of the offseason discussing some of the various aspects of the new CBA.

The CBA makes some important changes to divisional alignment, playoff structure, and the first-year amateur player draft. One relatively minor provision in the new CBA places some limitations on players’ use of smokeless tobacco, without actually banning its use.

Specifically, under the CBA, players have agreed to no longer carry in their pockets, at times when fans are in the ballpark, tobacco cans or packages. Players will also no longer be able to use tobacco during pregame or postgame interviews or at team functions.

Of course, these restrictions do not actually limit the use of tobacco on the field. Players just will not be able to carry the tins in their back pockets.

It is unclear why these new regulations were instituted; though, obviously the players’ union made these minor concessions at the urging of the Commissioner and politicians—who pushed a far more stringent ban on all on-field tobacco use. The new regulations do nothing to promote healthier ballplayers, as players will still be permitted to dip as much as they want. The regulations do not shield impressionable children from seeing their idols dip, as players will still fill their lower lip with dip as televisions cameras zoom in and broadcast their bulging lips and cheeks on oversized high-definition televisions for children everywhere to see and emulate.

Minor league baseball, where the players are not unionized, banned tobacco use since 1993.

Which Division is the Strongest in Baseball?

In 1994 Major League Baseball implemented its current playoff configuration: one that includes three divisions and a wild card in each league. Because of the 1994-95 players’ strike, MLB did not utilize its new playoff alignment until the 1995 postseason. The current playoff system has been in place for seventeen seasons.

I wanted to identify the individual divisions that have had the greatest playoff success, so as to find the “strongest division” in baseball. So, the way I measured the strength of these divisions was by adding up how many playoff series each division has won in this modern playoff system.

Here is what I did. I went through the past seventeen postseasons, and I counted how many playoff series each division won each postseason. This year, for example, the AL West won two series (the Rangers won the ALDS and ALCS); the AL Central won one series (Tigers won an ALDS); the AL East, NL East, and NL West each won zero series (the Rays, Yankees, Phillies, and Diamondbacks were all bumped without winning a series); and, the NL Central won four series (the Cardinals won three series—an NLDS, NLCS, and WS; and, the Brewers won one, a NLDS).

The totals reveal the most powerful postseason division the past seventeen seasons: the AL East. The NL East finished a close second place.

AL West: 17
AL Central: 13
AL East: 30

NL West: 15
NL Central: 18
NL East: 26

Most fans are probably not surprised by these numbers. While the AL and NL East have collectively achieved the most post season success, other MLB divisions have been relatively even.

A baseball observer may determine the relative strength of MLB’s various divisions a number of ways: total wins, post season berths, world championships, etc. But, I have not seen this particular measurement, which builds an obvious advantage into the division that lands the wild card (a wild card winner has won the World Series five times).

Recapping Early-Season Predictions

Back in early April I predicted who would earn each of the eight playoff spots. It turns out, I only identified two of the eight teams that eventually made the playoffs: the Phillies and the Yankees (who I picked as the AL Wildcard team).

My AL West pick: Oakland Athletics, 3rd place

I chose the A’s to win the AL West, largely because of their pitching staff. Unfortunately for Oakland, both Brett Anderson and Dallas Braden missed significant time this season with injuries. Also, the A’s never really hit. The Rangers enjoyed a resurgent Michael Young, and Mike Napoli had his best offensive year to date. The addition of Adrian Beltre and the usual contributions from Josh Hamilton, Ian Kinsler, Nelson Cruz, and the rest of the Rangers lineup were too much for the rest of the AL West.

My AL Central pick: Minnesota Twins, 5th place (worst record in AL)

I picked the Twins to take the AL Central. They, however, never got going at all. Their big boppers never developed any rhythm, as Justin Morneau and Joe Mauer were both sidelined for a large part of the season. A mid-market team like Minnesota cannot overcome so many injuries. Only three players played at least 100 games for the Twins this season (Valencia, Revere, Cuddyer). And, by the end of the season, only three position players on the Twins’ opening day squad were still on the active roster (Valencia, Butera, Cuddyer). The Tigers capitalized. Justin Verlander is the AL Cy Young frontrunner, and Miguel Cabrera is an MVP candidate. Combine that with great production from young Alex Avila, and veterans Jhonny Peralta and Victor Martinez, and run production wasn’t a major problem. Finally, Jose Valverde led the league in saves, closing the door in each of his save opportunities.

My AL East pick: Boston Red Sox, 3rd place

I went with Boston, and given the fact that they added Carl Crawford and Adrian Gonzalez to an already-good offensive lineup, I assumed they’d pitch well enough to cruise to an AL East title. Even with their payroll, starpower, and 90 wins, the Sox team ERA of 4.20 and historic collapse down the stretch (7-20 in September) left them at home this postseason. The Red Sox were 31 games over .500 at the end of August, leading the AL East. But ultimately, the Yankees capitalized on the Red Sox collapse, hitting their way to take the AL East crown; and, the Rays stormed back to win the AL Wildcard in dramatic fashion on the last day of the regular season.

My NL West pick: Los Angeles Dodgers, 3rd place

I felt the Dodgers would take the NL West. Matt Kemp and Clayton Kershaw will be candidates for the NL MVP and NL Cy Young, after posting outstanding season totals. But, the Dodgers were slow out of the gate offensively (see James Loney and Rod Barajas) and off-field distractions—ownership and bankruptcy—plagued the organization. They were fourteen games under .500 in early July, before playing a strong second half (34-20 in August/September) to finish the season three games over .500. The Arizona Diamondbacks came out of nowhere this season to win 94 games. The Diamondbacks hit just enough, and enjoyed consistent starting pitching (four starters won at least ten games, with ERAs below 3.70) and a strong bullpen anchored by JJ Putz. Analysts rave about the ballclub’s toughness and never-give-up attitude, that they attribute to manager Kirk Gibson’s influence.

My NL Central pick: Chicago Cubs, 5th place

Well, I went with the Cubs. Despite decent hitting (they were middle-of-the-NL in runs scored, and enjoyed good power production from Aramis Ramirez, Carlos Pena, and Alfonso Soriano), their pitching was absolutely atrocious. The Cubs’ team ERA was 4.34, worst in the NL. Both the Brewers and Cardinals reached the playoffs from the NL Central. The Brewers led the NL in homeruns and SLG. Also, the Brewers had five starters win at least 11 games as well as a bullpen featuring John Axford (46 saves, 1.95 ERA). The Cardinals hung around long enough to roll off an 18-win September to overcome the Braves for the NL Wildcard on the last day of the season.

My NL East pick: Philadelphia Phillies

I got this one correct. R2C2 (Roy Halladay, Roy Oswalt, Cliff Lee, Cole Hamels) was as good as advertised. The Phillies won 102 games (most in franchise history), were never below .500, and led (or shared the lead) in the NL East every day of the regular season except one (down by a half-game on April 26).

The MLB season is long and unpredictable. That doesn’t stop bloggers and fans all over from trying to guess what will happen and who will win.

Moneyball and OBP in Oakland

This past weekend marked the long-anticipated release of Moneyball, the movie adaptation of Michael Lewis’ book detailing the surprising success of the 2002 Oakland Athletics—a roster that Oakland GM Billy Beane formed partly on “undervalued” statistics—namely, on-base-percentage (OBP).

As demonstrated in the film, Beane opted for the “Moneyball” strategy following the 2001 season, as the Athletics attempted to inexpensively fill the offensive voids left by the departures of Jason Giambi and Johnny Damon. Yet, because the Athletics traditionally fall near the bottom of the MLB in payroll, Beane was forced to find cheaper offensive production.

In 2001, the last season of Giambi and Damon in Oakland, the AL’s average OBP was .334. The A’s had five hitters with OBPs above the AL average (Giambi-.477; brother Jeremy Giambi-.391; Frank Menechino-.369; Eric Chavez-.338; Terrence Long-.335). The A’s were 3rd in the AL with a collective .345 OBP.

The Moneyball era opened with the 2002 season, and despite the loss of Jason Giambi and his unworldly OBP, the A’s team OBP fell only slightly, to .339 (5th in the AL), while the AL average dropped to .331. Of the eight A’s players who regularly played that season, six of them reached base at rates above the AL average (David Justice-.376; Scott Hatteberg-.374; Mark Ellis-.359; Miguel Tejada-.354; Chavez-.348; Jermaine Dye-.333).

The A’s won the AL West again in 2003, though their team OBP (.327) fell below the AL average (.333). Only four hitters had above-average OBPs (Erubiel Durazo-.374; Chavez-.350; Hatteberg-.342; Tejada-.336).

In 2004, the A’s narrowly missed the playoffs, but still won 91 games. The 2004 AL average OBP was .338, and the A’s had the fifth best in the AL at .343. Five A’s reached base at a higher frequency than the average AL hitter (Chavez-.397; Durazo-.396; Mark Kotsay-.370; Hatteberg-.367; and former-Mariner Eric Byrnes-.347).

The 2005 A’s won 88 games but missed the playoffs by seven games. Again, they finished fifth in the AL in OBP (.330) with six players reaching base above the AL average (Ellis-.384; Dan Johnson-.355; Bobby Kielty-.350; Bobby Crosby-.346; Jason Kendall-.345; Hatteberg-.334).

The A’s last made the playoffs in 2006, winning the West by four games with 93 wins. They were 7th in the AL in OBP (.340) and had six players reach base at above AL-average rates (Frank Thomas-.381; Nick Swisher-.372; Milton Bradley-.370; Kendall-.367; Chavez-.351; Marco Scutaro-.350). The A’s were ultimately swept in the ALCS by the Tigers.

2007 was the last season that the A’s finished among the top six teams in OBP (.338). They’ve only reached the .500 plateau once since 2006 (2010, 81-81). The last four years, the A’s have been toward the bottom of the AL in OBP: 13th (.318), 11th (.328), 9th (.324), and 12th (.311).

Does the recent trend indicate the A’s are moving away from the Moneyball approach showcased in the film? We witnessed the A’s dump one of their more successful Moneyball-esque players last year, Jack Cust, owner of a career .381 OBP in an A’s uniform and the highest A’s season OBP (.408 in 2007) since Jason Giambi left for New York.

The A’s will continue to suffer from financial woes so long as they play their homes games at Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum. Over the past six seasons, the team had been no better than 12th in the AL (of 14) in attendance, finishing 13th twice and 14th twice. The A’s expect to hear from MLB very soon about a potential move to San Jose, where they’re hoping to build a new ballpark, generate greater revenue, and finally escape from their financial misery. But, with the Giants owning territorial rights to Santa Clara County, any move will be contentious.

The Effect of a Bean-Ball

On August 17th, former Mariner first-round draft pick, Brandon Morrow, threw a 97 mile-per-hour fastball high and inside to Mariner rookie, Casper Wells. Wells reacted, turning himself away from the pitch as best he could. Given the velocity of the pitch, though, Wells was unable to avoid the heater. The pitch glanced off his nose, requiring him to leave the ballgame.

Going into the game that day versus the Blue Jays, Wells was batting .280/.351/.516. Today, just over one month later, his numbers have declined to .237/.317/.442; and, he’s not even traveling with the team on the current road trip because he has felt sick and there is, according to Eric Wedge, “something going on with his head” requiring an MRI.

Since being hit in the nose by the Morrow fastball, a span of 18 games and 56 at-bats, Wells is batting just .125/.222/.250. He has hit just two homeruns, and struck out 23 times—over 40% of his at-bats.

It is possible that the slump may be attributed to opposing pitchers finally developing a more effective approach to beating Wells, now that he has played at the MLB level for a few months. Potentially of greater concern, though, is this: in the past, there have been hitters whose offensive production permanently declined following a hit-by-pitch to the head/face.

The most recent notable case study of offensive decline is David Wright. He was beaned by a Matt Cain fastball in August 2009. Mets fans will argue he has not hit the same since. Over his career, Wright has averaged 27 homeruns per season. In 2009, he hit just 10 homeruns, and now in 2011, he’s notched just 14. His OBP the past two seasons—.354 and .353—has been well below his career average of .381. Moreover, during his first four full seasons at the MLB level, David Wright never accumulated an offensive WAR (oWAR; wins-above-replacement value) below 5.4 (chronologically, beginning in 2005: 5.8; 5.4; 7.5; 6.7); but, over his last three seasons, he has not exceeded 4.6 (chronologically, beginning in 2009: 4.2; 4.6; 2.7).

David Wright’s production decline may not be entirely attributed to his being beaned in August 2009. But, many Mets followers seem to point to that incident as a turning point. Similarly, it may not be accurate to link Wells’ slump to his taking a Brandon Morrow fastball off the nose. Mariner fans hope that, in 2012, Casper Wells will look more like the guy we saw in August, with an OPS of .870, rather than the guy we have seen struggle thus far in September.